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IN THE SUPREME COURT Of THE STATE Of UTAH 
LOUIS L. MARKS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WHITE FAWN MILLING CORPORA-
TION, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant, 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Receiver, 
Respondent, 
T. H. HUMPHREYS, State Engineer_ of the 
State of Utah, 
Appellant, 
T. H. HUMPHREYS, State Engineer of 
the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
Appellant, 
MAXFIELD FEED & COAL, INCORPOR-
ATED, A Corporation, Successor in In-
terest to White Fawn Milling Corpora-
tion, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant, 
Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Statement of the Case 
No. 6229 
No. 6287 
This appeal raises a question of the proper con-
struction of Section 100-5-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, as.l!mended by C. 105, Laws of Utah, 1935, which 
section provides for appointment of water commissioners 
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by the State Engineer and authorizes the State Engineer 
to levy and collect assessments to pay the expenses of 
such commissioners. Two proceedings were instituted 
by the State Engineer to collect water assessments ag-
gregating $375.32 which were levied against a water 
right on the Jordan River owned by the White Fawn 
Milling Corporation. Decisions adverse to the contention 
of the State Engineer were rendered in both cases and 
appeals were taken to this -court. The two appeals were, 
by order of this court, consolidated for the purpose of 
hearing. 
Louis L. Marks v. White Fawn Milling Corporation 
Case No. 6229 
During the years 1937, 1938, and part of 1939, the 
White Fawn Milling Corporation was the owner of a 
right to use water of the Jordan River for milling pur-
poses. The water to which the Milling Company was en-
titled was distributed during those years by a water 
commissioner appointed by the State Engineer pursuant 
to the provisions of Section 100-5-1, Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933, and assessments against the claimant were 
levied by the State Engineer in order to pay the salary 
and expenses of the commissioner. The prorata share 
charged against the White Fawn Milling Corporation 
was $142.40 for 1937; $120.96 for 1938; ·and $111.96 for 
193"9. The assessments were levied on or ·about M~a-y 1 
of each year, as provided ~by the statute. 
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On June 10, 1939 the Third Judicial District Court 
of this State appointed Walker Bank & Trust Company 
as Receiver to take over all of the assets of the White 
Fawn ~Iilling Corporation, and thereafter notice was 
given requiring creditors to file claims on or before Aug-
ust 13, 1939. On June 21, 1939 the State Engineer filed 
his claim for the assessments mentioned above, claiming 
preference for such claim under the provisions of Title 
100, Revised St~tutes of Utah, 1933. In a petition for 
approval, allowance of claims, disallowance of claims, 
and authority to pay dividends, the Receiver alleged that 
the property of the "\Vhite Fawn 1Iilling Corporation, 
including its right to the use of the waters of the Jordan 
River, had been sold and that it had received as proceeds 
of such sale approximately $10,000. The claims are listed 
in the petition, and it is alleged that the claim of T. H. 
Humpherys as State Engineer covering said assessments 
should be denied as a preferred claim but allowed as a 
common claim. The appellant made a timely objection 
in writing to that part of the petition in which the Re~ 
ceiver recommended denial of the claim as a preferred 
claim, and at the time of hearing of the petition appeared 
before the court in support of its objection. The court, 
nevertheless, under date of December 22, 1939, by or-
der adopted the recommendations of the Receiver and 
disallowed the appellant's claim as a preferred clairn 
but allo,ved it as a common claim. Common creditors 
were paid only 25 per cent of their claims. Appellant 
assigns as error the making and entering of such order. 
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T. H. 1-lumphreys v. Maxfield Feed & Coal, 
Incorporated 
Case No. 6287 
On March 16, 1940, the State Engineer brought suit 
against Maxfield Feed & Coal, Incorporated, a corpora-
tion, purchaser of the White Fawn property, including 
its water rights, from the Receiver, seeking to restrain 
it from using water from Jordan River until the delin-
quencies mentioned above had been paid. It is alleged in 
the complaint that the State Engineer notified the defend-
ant to pay all delinquencies forthwith or it would be 
forbidden the use of water from Jordan River, as pro-
vided by Section 100-5-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
but that nevertheless the defendant has refused to pay 
such delinquencies, and, unless restrained by the court, 
the defendant will continue to use the water of Jordan 
River without paying delinquent water assessments. To 
this action the defendant answered, admitting that 
that assessments were levied against its predecessors, 
denying that it had assumed the obligation to pay past 
assessments by purchasing the White Fawn water right, 
and allegjng that the State Engineer filed his claim for 
water assessments with the Receiver of the Milling Com-
pany, that the claim was. disallowed as a preferred claim 
but was allowed as a common claim, and that the Re-
ceiver had paid to defendant as a dividend 25 per cent 
of its claim which amounted to $93.83. It is further 
alleged in the answer that the water right in question 
was conveyed to the defendant by means of a recel.ver's 
deed, which is attached to the answer as Exhibit "A". 
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The case "\Vas tried on the pleadings and upon a 
stipulation of facts. It \vas admitted by the defendant 
in open court that the assessments mentioned in the 
complaint were duly levied by the State Engineer prior 
to the receivership and prior to the transfer to Max-
field Feed & Coal, Incorporated, and that the amounts 
set forth in the complaint were correct. It was admitted 
by the plaintiff that he had filed a claim for $375.32 
with the Receiver covering the water assessments in 
question and that the claim was disallowed as a pre-
ferred claim but was allowed as a common claim, and 
that the Receiver paid a dividend on the claim, but that 
such dividend was accepted by the State Engineer upon 
a written stipulation that it would not prejudice his 
rights to pursue his claim as a preferred clain1. The 
court made findings of fact in ccordance with the stip-
ulation of the parties, concluded that the plaintiff was 
entitled to no relief, and entered a decree dismissing 
the suit. The appellant assigned as error the conclusion 
of la\v and the decree. 
Argument 
It will be observed that the State Engineer has by 
this litigation attempted collection of delinquent water 
assessments from both the seller and the buyer. It is his 
contention that he is entitled to payment of his claim, 
either by the Receiver from the proceeds of the sale or by 
the transferee of the water right, or he is entitled to a 
judgrnent enforcing his order forbidding the use of 
water until the water assessments are paid in full. The 
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question in both cases is primarily one "of statutory con-
struction. Section 100-5-1 provides in part as follows: 
"Whenever in the judgment of the state engineer 
or the distirct court, it is necessary to appoint one 
or more water commissioners for the distribu-
tion of water from any river system or water 
source, such commissioner or commissioners sha11 
be appointed annually by the state engineer, after 
consultation with the water users. The form of 
such consultation and notice to be given shall be 
determined by the state engineer as shall best suit 
local conditions, full expression of majority opin-
ion being_, however, provided for. If a majority 
of the water users, as a result of such consulta-
tion, shall ag:r:ee upon some competent person or 
persons to be appointed as water commissioner or 
commissioners, the duties he or they shall perform 
and the compensation he or they shall receive, and 
shall make recommendations to the state engineer 
as to such matters or either of them, the state 
engineer shall act in accordance with their recom-
mendations; but if a majority of water users do 
not agree as to such matters, then the state en-
gineer shall make a determination for them. The 
salary and expenses of such commissioner or com-
missioners shall be borne pro rata by the users 
of water from such river system or water source, 
upon a schedule to be fixed by the state engineer, 
based on the established rights of each water 
user, and such prorata share shall be paid by each 
water user to the state engineer in advance on 
or before the first day of May each year, and 
u_pon failure so to do the state engineer may 
forbid the use of water by any such delinquent 
while such default continues, and may bring an 
action in the district co:urt for such unpaid e~.~ 
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pense and salary, or the district court having 
jurisdiction of his person n1ay issue an order to 
show cause upon any delinquent user why a 
judgment for such sum should not be entered. Any 
such commissioner or commissioners may be re-
moved by the state engineer for cause. The users 
of water fron1 any river system or water source 
may petition the district court for the removal of 
any such commissioner or commissioners, and 
after notice and hearing the court may order the 
removal of such commissioner or commissioners 
and direct the state engineer to appoint successors 
as necessary. ' ' 
Under familiar rules of statutory construction, the 
courts must determine the intent and purpose of the 
legislature in enacting the law and, if necessary, must 
liberally construe the statute to effect that purpose. Sec-
ion 88-2-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, provides: 
"The rule of the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has 
no application to the statutes of this state. The 
statutes established the laws of this state re-
specting the subjects to which they relate, and 
their provisions and all proceedings under them 
are to be liberally construed with a view to effect 
the objects of the statutes and to promote jus-
tice. vVhenever there is any variance between 
the rules of equity and the rules of common law 
in reference to the same matter the rules of 
equity shall prevail.'' 
See also to the same effect Baker v. Latse.s, 60 Utah 38, 
206 P. 553; Utah Association of Life Underwriters v. 
Mountain States Insurance Company, 58 Utah 579, 200 
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P. 673 ; Houston Real _Estate 0 ompany v. Hechler, 44 
Utah 64, 138 P. 1159; State v. Hendrickson, 67 Utah 15, 
245 P. 375; State v. Franklin, 63 Utah 442, 226 P. 674; 
Board of Education of Carbon Oottnty School District 
v. Bryner, 57 Utah 78, 192 P. 627; see' large number of 
cases collected, 59 C. J. 973; 59 C. J. 1129. 
It is a fundamental concept of the water law of Utah 
and other western States that water in its natural source 
is the property of the public. This concept has been 
declared by the legislature many times both before and 
after statehood. Water in a natural source can never 
be privately o'vned even by the State or the United 
States. All that can be ac.quired is a right of use. The 
legislature has prescribed conditions under which water 
may be appropriated and used and conditions under 
which water rights are terminated. One condition to 
enjoyment of such rights which found its way into the 
law before any legislation on the subject makes necessary 
a continuous b~neficial use of water. 
If any person entitled to the use of 'vater shall, for 
a period of five years, fail to put the water so claimed 
to a beneficial use, the right of use ceases. It is imma-
terial whether the right reverts to the State or accrues 
to other appropriators; the fact is that the right of the 
delinquent is terminated. In a like manner, if the owner 
of the right of use fails to pay the duly and legally levied 
assessment of the State Engineer for the distribution 
of water, his right may be terminated during the period 
of such delinquency. 
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It cannot be logically contended that the mere trans .. 
fer of title. can revive this right. The only method of re. 
viving the right is to pay the assessment. This burden 
must be borne by the- one who would exercise the right, 
whether it be the one who claimed the water vvhen the 
assessment was levied.or a transferee thereafte.r. 
Assume that instead of authorizing the State En-
gineer to levy assessments, as provided by the statute, 
in order to cover the cost of the service by the State 
Engineer, the legislature should provide for the levying 
of a tax upon the use of water. Under such procedure, 
it would be obvious that the owner of the water could not 
free the water from the· tax merely by deeding his water 
away. Under the law, where a farm is sold for delinquent 
taxes, the water right appurtenant to the farm is im-
pressed with the lien of the tax and passes upon the 
tax sale with the land. 
The assessments made by the State Engineer in 
many respects are like a special tax. We respectfully 
urge that these assessments are impressed upon the prop-
erty itself, and follow it into the hands of successive. 
claimants. If this be true, the lien or condition. precedent 
to the continued use of the water cannot be discharged 
by any payment of a prorata part of the assessment, but 
the right is restored only, as in the case of a tax, by 
the payment in full of the amount due. 
The objects and purposes of the section of the stat-
ute under consideration may be gathered fron). the whole 
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of Title 100, which relates to water and irrigation. Sec-
tion 100-2-1 authorizes the Governor to appoint a State 
Engineer and, among other things, provides that the 
State Engineer shall distribute the waters of the State 
to those entitled thereto according to the administration 
and distribution of water and sets up an orderly pro-
cedure based on democratic principles for the appoint-
ment of water commissioners. It prescribes the _duties 
of such commissioners and, necessarily, provides for pay-
ment of expenses by those to be benefited. 
•, 
It is apparent the legislature intended that (1) water 
is to be distributed by public officers, to wit: the State 
Engineer and his commissioners; ( 2) such commissioners 
must be appointed after consultation with the water users 
in accordance with the wishes of the majority; (3) com-
missioners must be paid by those benefited, namely, the 
water users; and ( 4) the plan of payment for the 
services of the commissioners contemplates collection of 
assessments by the State Engineer as an agent of the 
users. To enforce payment, the State Engineer is author-
izd to forbid the use of water by any such delinquent 
while the default continues, and he may bring an action 
in the district court for such unpaid expense and salary, 
of the district court, having jurisdiction of the person of 
the water user, and may issue an order against any delin-
quent user requiring him to show cause why judgment 
for such sums should not be entered. 
The legislature intended by the language used to 
give the State Engineer two remedies one in rem and 
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one in personam. Upon breach of the condition requiring 
payment of expense of distribution he may deny the use 
of water. It should be noted in this connection that there 
is no language to the effect that the first remedy is ap-
plicable only when the water right is owned by the person 
against "vhom the assessment was levied. The statute 
gives the State Engineer unlimited and unqualified au-
thority to forbid the use of water until delinquencie.s are 
paid. 
If the language of the statute is construed in accord-
ance with the intention of the legislature, and it must be 
and, if it is construed liberally to make effective the 
powers granted to the State Engineer to collect water 
assessments, the court must hold that the law giving 
the State Engineer the right to forbid the use of the water 
to enforce collection imposes some 'S-ort of a statutory 
charge or condition upon a water right which cannot be 
defeated by mere assignment or transfer of the right. 
If payment of a water assessment may be so easily de-
feated, an insolvent water user could simply transfer his 
water right around the family or among friends every 
year and avoid payment. If assessments do not follow 
the right, the State Engineer could not successfully 
forbid the use of water by the assignee of the right, and 
the object and purpose of the statute to make collection 
of water assessments as e-ffectual as possible would be 
circumvented. 
As stated above, the statute requires all water users 
to share the expense of water commissioners upon a pro-
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rata basis. If the obligation against the water may be 
disposed ·of by assignment, other users from the san1e 
source must make up deficiencies resulting therefrom. 
The State Engineer must in such case make a new levy 
to pay bills which were successfully avoided by transfer. 
The court has already had under consideration the 
question as to whether the State Engineer in collecting 
water assessments must proceed against one who by con-
tract assumed the obligation to pay assessments instead 
or against the water user directly liable. In the case of 
Minersville Reservoir & Irrigation Company v. Rocky 
Ford Irrigation Company, 90 Utah 283, 61 P. (2d) 605, 
the court made the following remarks which are pertinent 
here: 
''Plaintiff is a water user of Beaver river and 
as such is clearly liable to the state engineer for 
the pa)lllent of its pro-rated share of expenses 
incident to the services rendered by the water com-
missioner. Plaintiff may not escape that liability 
to the state engineer so long as it remains a water 
user. The right of the state engineer to collect 
assessments from the water user cannot be de-
feated by an attempt of the "\Vater user to assign 
its liability for the payment thereof to another. 
The burden of the liability is· not so easy to 
escape. If it were, all of the water users of a 
stream or other source of supply might assign 
their liability to pay water assessments to so1ne 
irresponsible person and thus render collection 
impossible . 
"lt is plaintiff's contention that an assessment 
made by the· state ·engineer on its water right is 
· an encui-nbrance:thereon or when not paid becomes 
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such 'vithin the n1eaning of the contract. The de-
fendant contends to the contrary. Each of the 
parties have cited cases and texts dealing with 
incnntbrances. \V e have examined these cases and 
texts but find then1 of little aid to us in the pres-
ent injury. Generally speaking, an ''incumbrance'' 
is a burden or charge on property. In a sense an 
~tnpa,id U'ater assessment becomes an incumbrance 
against the water right when the state engineer 
refuses to deliver the water because the assess-
ment is not pa~id. R. S. 1933, 100-5-1, vests in the 
state engineer, in the event the assessments are 
not paid, authority to "forbid the use of water 
by any such delinquent while such default con 
tinned,'' or he may bring an action in the distriet 
court for unpaid expenses and salary, or the dis-
trict court, having jurisdiction of the person, may 
issue an order directing a delinquent user to show 
cause why a judgment for such sum should. not 
he entered against hi1n. If. the language relied 
upon by plaintiff is given the broad meaning con-
tended for, it would follo\v· that the defendant 
would be obligated to pay an incumbrance placed 
on its \Vater right by the plaintiff itself. That such 
was not the intention of the parties is not open 
to doubt. If we are correct in the view heretofore 
expressed in this opinion that plaintiff owes a 
duty which it rnay· .not escape to pay the state 
engineer the asses~n1_ent .levied against its water 
right, it follows that plaintiff ·may not be heard to 
complain when its property :_becomes incumbered 
because of its failure to perform that duty.'' 
. . If, as stated by this court, the legislature did not 
intend that collection of water assessments can be de-
feated or made more difficult by contracts between water 
user~, it, to be consistent ·and to giv~ effect to the pur-
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pose and policies of the statute, must hold that the obliga-
tion against the water right cannot be avoided· by trans-
fer. In this case it cannot be contended that the Maxfield 
Feed & Coal, Incorporated, was a purchaser without 
notice of the claim of the State Engineer. Such claim 
had been filed with the Receiver as a preferred claim 
before Maxfield Feed & Coal, Incorporated, became a 
purchaser. 
It will be noted that under the language of the stat-
ute the remedies of the State Engineer are not stated 
in the alternative but are stated cumulatively. The State 
Engineer may forbid the use of water and sue for the 
amount due. Both remedies have been pursued in an 
effort to collect the delinquent water assessment against 
the White Fawn right, and it is respectfully. submitted 
that either the Receiver must pay the claim in full or the 
State Engineer's order forbidding the use of water until 
the assessment is paid must b~ enforced. 
W. W:.RAY, 
JOSEPH .CHEZ, 
Attorney .General, 
G. A. GILES, 
· . Assistant .. Attorney. General, 
E. J~ SKEEN, 
· · -.. :·.:: · Specia~ Asst .. Attorney General, 
.. ··Attorneys for Appellant. 
- .. 
·.4:-~t<J~nev :f~~- Amici C'Uri~e._. 
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